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PATENT TROLLS, NUISANCE SUITS, AND THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION 
By Matthew Spitzer1 
The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) Patent Assertion 
Entity Activity Report (“The Report”) includes a path-breaking 
collection of data. The Report was compiled with the object of 
changing policy, both in Congress and before the courts. Because 
of the FTC’s ability to force businesses and individuals to provide 
information, a power that no ordinary researcher possesses, the 
FTC has amassed a data set that can potentially be of great value. 
For example, the Report’s description of litigation Patent Assertion 
Entities’ (“PAEs”) and portfolio PAEs’ structure and behavior is, 
although not entirely new, very instructive. Unfortunately, the FTC 
made analytical errors that preclude using its work to directly 
support policy prescriptions. First, the FTC claims that if a suit 
settles for less than $300,000, then the suit was likely Negative 
Expected Value (“NEV”). In addition, the FTC claims that NEV 
suits are bad. These claims are analytically false. Second, the FTC’s 
policy recommendations have no connection to any of its factual 
analysis. Although this does not prove that the policy 
recommendations are bad ideas, the FTC’s factual analysis gives 
the reader no help, at all, in deciding on the merits of the 
                                                
 1 Howard and Elizabeth Chapman Professor of Law and Director, Searle Center 
on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, Pritzker Law School, Northwestern 
University. I received very helpful comments from Andrew Daughety, Anne 
Layne-Farrar, Alex Lee, Suzanne Munck, Jennifer Reinganum, David Schwartz, 
Jean Spitzer, Greg Sidak, Kathy Spier, and all of the participants at the Searle 
Center’s Public Policy Forum on the Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC 
Study, October 13, 2016. The author grudgingly accepts responsibility for 
remaining errors. The author received support from the Searle Center while 
preparing this article. The Searle Center has been supported by a very large gift 
from the late Dan Searle, as well as by major gifts from Qualcomm, Microsoft, 
Intellectual Ventures, and Google. A list of the Searle Center’s donors can be 
found at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/ 
documents/Searle_Center_Support_July%202017.pdf. 
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recommendations. Further, because the Report’s analytics are so 
flawed, they cannot help one evaluate any proposed new policies. 
Therefore, in terms of providing normative guidance, the Report is 
a failure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), a powerful federal 
administrative agency whose jurisdiction includes competition 
policy and consumer protection, released in 2016 a Patent Assertion 
Entity Activity Report (the “Report”) on the litigation activities of 
Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”).2 In this report the FTC 
denigrates the activities of PAEs, partly by calling them “patent 
                                                
 2 FTC, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-
activity-ftc-study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_ 
an_ftc_study_0.pdf. Patent trolls are also sometimes called Patent Assertion 
Entities (PAEs) or Non Practicing Entities (NPEs). In this article I will use the 
terms patent troll and PAE interchangeably. 
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trolls.” The denigration of PAEs in the Report supports harmful 
policy initiatives that would change patent law in ways that are bad 
for society. 
Patents are property rights to certain technologies, limited in 
time and scope, issued by the Federal government to inventors who 
satisfy a set of prerequisites.3 Patents are explicitly authorized by the 
United States Constitution,4 to “promote the [P]rogress of 
[S]cience.” This phrase is understood today to encompass at least 
two different ideas. The first is that limited monopoly will 
incentivize inventors to invent—which will ultimately benefit 
many.5 Second, the patent rights are extremely useful at 
commercializing inventions and providing a foundation for 
disclosing inventions to firms without worrying about theft of ideas.6 
                                                
 3 Patent law is codified in Title 35 of the United States Code. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 
101–103 (2006). Section 101 allows patents in a useful “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter” that is “new and useful.” § 101. Section 
102 explains what it means to be “new,” while § 103 requires that the invention 
not be “obvious” to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See §§ 101–102. 
 4 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”). 
 5 See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of 
Resources for Invention, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 
(Richard R. Nelson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1962); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Richard C. 
Levin, Appropriability, R&D Spending, and Technological Performance, 78 AM. 
ECON. REV. 424 (1988). But see, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, 
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS 
AT RISK (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); Michele Boldrin & David Levine, The 
Case Against Intellectual Property, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 209 (2002); Michele 
Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 
(2013). 
 6 See Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. 
REV. 1565, 1572 (2016) (“Without some form of regulatory intervention, an 
inventor would be unable to appropriate enough of the benefits of her invention 
to recoup the cost of making it, leading to the under-production of inventions 
generally.”); see also Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of 
the Market for Inventions, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271, 274 (2015) 
(“Patents promote disclosure of inventions, which reduces costs of search and 
bargaining in the market for inventions.”). 
78 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 75 
Commercializing inventions is crucial for making consumers better 
off; if the consumers cannot buy products utilizing new technology,7 
they are not enriched. 
For most of our country’s history, patents were usually asserted 
by patent-holders who were producing goods and services with their 
patented technology.8 However, within the past twenty years,9 the 
emergence of a new type of firm has challenged, for some, the 
positive arguments for patents. The new firms, known as either 
patent trolls or PAEs, acquire patents with the intent only to assert 
the patents against firms that manufacture and distribute goods. 
Under either name they are controversial. PAEs do not use the 
patents to manufacture or distribute their own goods. Hence, some 
commentators maintain that PAEs do not contribute to economic 
activity, but rather slow down the activity of other firms.10 Other 
commentators have suggested changing patent laws to respond to 
PAEs’ activities.11 
The discomfort with patent trolls burst into the mainstream legal 
consciousness in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange12 in 2006. eBay 
concerned patents, owned by MercExchange, that covered eBay’s 
“Buy It Now” element.13 eBay tried to license MercExchange’s 
patents, but negotiations failed.14 Following trial, a jury awarded 
                                                
 7 This includes products that are produced using the new, inventive techniques. 
 8 David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing 
Entities in the Marketplace, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2013). 
 9 For example, Intellectual Ventures, arguably the largest Patent Assertion 
Entity, was founded in 2000. Leadership, INTELL. VENTURES, 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/about/leadership/nathan-myhrvold/ (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
 10 See sources infra note 24-26. 
 11 Id. 
 12 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also Robert P. 
Merges, Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange, 
21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997 (2006); Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-
Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
114 (2010); Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and 
Why: An Analysis of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 
677 (2015) (revisiting the impact of the eBay decision) 
 13 eBay, 547 U.S. at 390. 
 14 Id. 
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damages of $30,000,000 to MercExchange.15 MercExchange moved 
for permanent injunctive relief, but was denied by the District Court 
Judge.16 This denial of the request for an injunction ultimately made 
its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. In a unanimous 
decision the Court announced that patent-holders would no longer 
be routinely entitled to injunctive relief. Instead, trial courts were to 
apply a four-part test when a patent-holder requested an injunction.17 
What was the reason for this massive change in the law? A four-
Justice concurrence by Justice Kennedy spelled it out: 
In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many 
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic 
function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier 
cases. An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a 
basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for 
obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed 
as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to 
buy licenses to practice the patent. When the patented invention is but a 
small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the 
threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the 
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.18 
Justice Kennedy’s explanation implicitly contained a basic 
concern about PAEs: they would cause economic damage by 
asserting patents over small components of much larger products. 
The full theory was also spelled out in 2006, in likely the best-
known and most widely cited law review article on the topic, Patent 
                                                
 15 Id. at 391. 
	 16 Id. 
 17 Id. (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.”). 
 18 Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Kirti 
Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent 
Cases (Univ. Ill. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-03), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629399 (describing the 
impact of the eBay decision on injunctive relief in patent cases). 
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Holdup and Royalty Stacking, by Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro.19 
The problem, explained by Lemley and Shapiro, stems from two 
issues. 
One is Holdup. If the courts grant injunctions to those firms that 
hold patents on small components of larger products after the larger 
product has been designed and produced – a situation called patent 
holdup, the patent-holder will be able to shut down manufacture and 
sale of the larger product completely.20 To escape the force of the 
injunction, the firms making the product (“producer”) must get the 
assent of the patent-holder. There have been two traditional ways of 
doing this. First, if the patent-holder is also a producer of a product, 
the second firm (which is also a producer) can threaten to sue the 
patent-holder for infringement of patents that the second firm holds. 
The two firms then settle by cross-licensing. Second, the producing 
firm can offer to pay the patent-holder money, in theory up to the 
full value of the product. However, if the patent-holder does not 
produce (and, hence, is a troll or a Patent Assertion Entity), then no 
cross-licensing is possible. The only thing the producing firm can 
do is pay, and pay dearly. However, a rational firm, anticipating such 
                                                
 19 See Articles, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl 
=en&as_sdt=0%2C14&q=lemley+and+shapiro&oq=Lemley+and (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2018) (showing that Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and 
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2006) has been cited over 1200 times); 
see also Ted Sichelman, Most Cited IP Law Articles over the Last 10 years, 
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 24, 2014), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com 
/2016/03/most-cited-ip-law-articles-published-in.html. Professor Sichelman 
reports that the Lemley and Shapiro article was the second-most cited article in 
all of Intellectual Property Law from 2004-2008. See id. That category includes 
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright. See id. Mark Lemley is likely the most 
influential scholar in the field. See id.  He authored or coauthored the number 1, 
2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, and 14 most cited articles in Professor Sichelman’s list of 25. 
See id. 
 20 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Treating RAND Commitments Neutrally, 11 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 2–3 (2015); Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, 
Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 603–04 (2007) (“In very broad 
terms, opportunism or hold-up arises when a gap between economic commitments 
and subsequent commercial negotiations enables one party to capture part of the 
fruits of another’s investment, broadly construed.”); Schwartz & Kesan, supra 
note 8, at 429. 
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hold-up behavior, may decide not to produce in the first place. Then 
we are all worse off because we have no product to consume.21 
The other is Royalty Stacking. If there are many different patent-
holders that have patents that read on a product, the injunction 
problem will be made much worse. Many injunctions will be very 
hard to navigate. But even if the court awards only damages to the 
patent-holders, the sum of the royalty payments may exceed the 
value of the product. If the patent-holders do not produce anything, 
cross-licensing is ruled out as a solution. Each patent-holder will 
have the incentive to ask for the largest award it can get, regardless 
of the effect on the size of the total royalty bill to the producer. 
Again, a producer, anticipating this situation, may choose not to 
produce in the first place; we are all worse off.22 This narrative is 
reflected in many papers by Lemley and Shapiro23 and in others.24 
                                                
 21 Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2006). 
 22 Id. (“Such royalty overcharges act as a tax on new products incorporating the 
patented technology, thereby impeding rather than promoting innovation.”). 
 23 See generally, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the 
ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012); Farrell et al., supra 
note 20; Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1347 (2008) (studying the value of determining patent validity prior 
to licensing patents to “downstream technology users”); Mark A. Lemley, 
Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008); Mark A. Lemley, Are 
Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 
(2008) (arguing that universities should prioritize the social impact of their 
technology over licensing revenue); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About 
Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007) 
(proposing solutions to the patent holdup problem); Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013) (advocating a standard 
set of rules governing commitments between patent owners and implementers of 
standards to determine royalty rates); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005) (noting, in part, that patent 
litigation settlements often have the negative side effect of limiting competition); 
Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 280 (2010) (indicating that injunctions affect royalties negotiated between 
patent holders and technology users). 
 24 See generally, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs 
from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014) (estimating the size and 
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There are, of course, counter-narratives. For one, PAEs provide 
a middleman market for small inventors who otherwise would be 
unable to earn any money from inventive activity.25 A small inventor 
cannot credibly threaten to sue a major industrial firm, and therefore 
cannot get a licensing deal. Instead, the small inventor can sell the 
patent to a PAE who can sue the major industrial firm, garnering 
some money. A second counter-narrative is that the arguments about 
patent holdup and royalty stacking prove far too much. They should 
apply with the most force to complex products with up to tens of 
thousands of patents that read on them. The force of these arguments 
should greatly slow or even stop innovation on smart phones, 
tablets, portable computers, automobiles, and so forth. And yet it is 
precisely in these areas that both casual empiricism and recent more 
formal analysis26 suggests that the rate of innovation is extremely 
                                                
impact of NPE patent assertions); George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust 
Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 
913 (2011); Bernhard Ganglmair et al., Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a 
Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation, 60 J. INDUS. ECON. 249 (2012); 
Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Preventing Patent Hold Up: An Economic Assessment 
of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445 (2009); 
Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the 
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 729–35 
(2005); see also Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 8 (disputing Bessen and Meurer’s 
methodology). 
 25 Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean 
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137 (2015) (outlining the argument and then 
presenting survey evidence purporting to cast doubt on the argument). 
 26 See J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of 
Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 714 (2008), for the immediate, direct response to Lemley and 
Shapiro’s Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, supra note 21. See also, e.g., 
Alexander Galetovic & Kirti Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential 
Patents: Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry 2–3 (Feb. 
2017), SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2790347; 
Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray? 32 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 1313 (2017); Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 
Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties? 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 
(2008); Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup 
Theory, 13 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1 (2017); Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., 
“Excessive Royalty” Prohibitions and the Dangers of Punishing Vigorous 
Competition and Harming Incentives to Innovate, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 
OCT. 2018] Patent Trolls 83 
high and that consumers benefit greatly. A third counter-narrative is 
that “troll” or “PAE” is a far too broad category to be useful for 
policy arguments. Undoubtedly the best work in this vein is by 
Christopher Cotropia, Jay Kesan, and David Schwartz.27 They show 
that these big terms include a wide range of litigators, including 
those who invent and patent new technologies, such as industrial 
laboratories, small inventors, and universities, former practicing 
entities who can make money by asserting their patents despite 
product failures in the marketplace, those who purchase patents for 
the purpose of asserting them, and others. For most people, 
intuitions vary widely as to the social value of each type of patent 
asserting entity. None of these counter-narratives has calmed the 
concerns with PAEs. 
The America Invents Act (“AIA”) of 201128 was seen, in no 
small part, as a response to PAEs. Some commentators have claimed 
that PAEs tend to own weak patents.29 In response, the AIA made it 
                                                
(2016); J. Gregory Sidak, Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate 
Patent Holdup?, 1 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 601 (2016); Kirti Gupta et al., IP 
Leadership Brussels: Highlights and Economic Analysis, COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/11/CPI-Gupta-Wong-Ervin-Coniglio-Naegele.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 
2018); Devlin Hartline & Matthew Barblan, Debunking the Royalty Stacking 
Theory: Real-World Evidence From the Mobile Wireless Industry, CTR. FOR THE 
PROT. OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. (Jan. 2016), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/31/2016/01/Hartline-Barblan-Debunking-the-Royalty-
Stacking-Theory.pdf. 
 27 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking 
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014). Some of this was 
anticipated, but without the empirical rigor of Cotropia, Kesan and Schwartz. See 
also Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013). 
 28 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 29 See generally John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme 
Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009); Jay Pil Choi, Live and Let Live: A Tale of Weak Patents, 
3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 724 (2005); David Encaoua & Yassine Lefouili, Licensing 
“Weak” Patents, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 492 (2009); Anne Layne-Farrar & Klaus M. 
Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls,” Market Structure, 
and “Excessive” Royalties, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1121 (2010). 
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easier for those who opposed a patent to challenge its validity before 
the US Patent and Trademark Office.30 
The concern with trolls/PAEs did not stop with the passage of 
the AIA. In February of 2013 President Obama condemned trolls in 
a speech.31 In response, in June of 2013, the FTC decided to 
investigate PAE activity.32 The FTC is a powerful administrative 
agency whose jurisdiction includes promoting competition and 
consumer protection.33 The agency has authority to issue trade 
regulation rules, to review mergers, and to gather data and issue 
reports.34 The FTC’s data-gathering power is quite substantial: 
Another investigative tool, this one available in both competition and 
consumer protection matters, appears in Section 6 of the FTC Act, 15 
U.S.C. Sec. 46. Section 6(b) empowers the Commission to require the 
filing of “annual or special . . . reports or answers in writing to specific 
questions” for the purpose of obtaining information about “the 
organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to 
other corporations, partnerships, and individuals” of the entities to whom 
the inquiry is addressed. . . .  
The Commission’s 6(b) authority enables it to conduct wide-ranging 
economic studies that do not have a specific law enforcement 
purpose. . . . Section 6(b) enables the Commission to obtain answers to 
specific questions as part of an antitrust law enforcement investigation, 
where such information would not be available through subpoena 
because there is no document that contains the desired answers. Section 
6 also authorizes the Commission to “make public from time to time” 
                                                
 30 See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2017). The new process, called Inter Partes Review, 
allows a petitioner to challenge the validity of a patent under § 102 (novelty) or 
§ 103 (obviousness). 
 31 Diane Bartz, Obama Says Patent Reform Needs to Go Farther, REUTERS 
(Feb. 14, 2013, 8:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-
patent/obama-says-patent-reform-needs-to-go-farther-
idUSBRE91E03320130215. 
 32 Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Is Said to Plan Inquiry of Frivolous Patent Lawsuits, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/business/ftc-
is-said-to-plan-inquiry-of-frivolous-patent-lawsuits.html. Note that the order of 
President Obama’s condemnation and the FTC’s data gathering is, from a logical 
point of view, completely backwards. 
 33 See What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-
we-do (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). Investigating PAE litigation activity probably 
fits best with the competition side of the agency. 
 34 Authority stemming from 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2017), known as “section 6.” 
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portions of the information that it obtains, where disclosure would serve 
the public interest (15 U.S.C. Sec. 46(f)).35 
The FTC gathered information and then issued the Report that 
this article critiques. The Report collected data on PAEs, organized 
it, reported on the data, and suggested four public policy changes.36 
This article will show that the FTC made critical analytical errors 
that greatly limit the Report’s usefulness. But before we get to the 
sections explaining the errors we must spend a few pages reviewing 
the Report’s intended purposes. 
The FTC’s data, collected under the authority of Section 6(b) of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act,37 revealed some fascinating 
insights.38 First, the FTC’s data revealed two different types of 
PAEs: in the words of the FTC, “portfolio” PAEs and “litigation” 
PAEs. Their behaviors are very different. Portfolio PAEs tend to 
send demand letters to manufacturers (rather than suing first), to 
offer licenses to large portfolios of patents, to enter into licenses 
without ever suing the manufacturer, and to obtain licenses that 
typically run in the millions of dollars.39 More than 80% of the 
reported revenue from patent licenses flow to portfolio PAEs, rather 
than to litigation PAEs. But the portfolio PAEs file a small minority 
of the lawsuits found in the FTC’s study. In contrast to portfolio 
PAEs, litigation PAEs tend to file suit before contacting the target 
manufacturers, tend to own and license fewer than 10 patents, and 
tend to settle their lawsuits relatively quickly and for relatively small 
amounts of money.40 
                                                
 35 A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law 
Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 46). 
 36 See FTC, supra note 2, at 1-13. 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2017). 
 38 This description is a summary of the FTC’s description. The underlying data 
has not been made available to researchers. My conversation with Suzanne 
Munck, Deputy Director and Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property at the 
Federal Trade Commission, strongly suggests that the FTC has no plans to release 
the data in any form. 
 39 FTC, supra note 2, at 3. 
 40 Id. at 92. 
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The portfolio PAEs and litigation PAEs operate in different 
structural fashion. The portfolio PAEs raise money from investors, 
often including investment funds and manufacturing firms. They 
then use the money to buy large numbers of patents and assemble 
them into one or more large portfolios. The portfolio PAEs assert 
the large portfolio(s) against a target manufacturer, obtain a large 
license fee, and pass part of the license fee back to the investors in 
the particular portfolio(s) that were asserted. Litigation PAEs, in 
contrast, are thinly capitalized and have between one and three 
individual owners. The litigation PAEs acquire a (small) portfolio 
of patents, assign the portfolio to an “affiliate”, usually set up as an 
LLC, and the affiliate asserts through litigation the portfolio against 
a target manufacturer and usually obtains a relatively small amount 
of money for a license. Litigation PAEs tend to use “revenue 
sharing.”41 Thus, sellers of the patents keep a financial interest in the 
revenues derived from asserting the patents that they sell to the PAE, 
and sometimes the seller has to assist with the litigation.42 Attorneys 
representing the litigation PAEs usually work on a contingency fee 
arrangement. 
The amount of the license fees that flowed to litigation PAEs 
came in for special attention from the FTC. “77% of reported 
Litigation PAE licenses were for less than $300,000.”43 Because the 
FTC believed that $300,000 represents the lower bound on the costs 
of litigating a patent, small settlements indicated that many or most 
of the litigation PAEs’ suits were “nuisance” suits.44 Nuisance suits, 
as used in the FTC’s PAE Report, are those that cost more to litigate 
than the expected recovery after trial. And such suits, according to 
the FTC, are bad. “Nuisance infringement litigation . . . can tax 
judicial resources and divert attention away from productive 
business behavior.”45 
We will have much to say in the pages that follow about 
nuisance suits and the FTC’s jumping to conclusions about whether 
                                                
 41 Id. at 48. 
 42 Id. at 49. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 4. 
 45 Id. at 9. 
OCT. 2018] Patent Trolls 87 
these patent lawsuits have social value. But before we get there, we 
must point out that the FTC made four policy proposals, ostensibly 
grounded in their observation about nuisance suits. The four 
proposed reforms are: 
1. Develop rules and case management practices to address discovery 
burden and cost asymmetries in PAE litigation.”46 The FTC noted that 
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to meet 
and work on producing a plan for discovery. The FTC suggested that 
Rule 26 should be amended, inter alia, to require early disclosure of 
asserted claims and infringement and invalidity contentions, as well as 
to limit discovery before preliminary motions together with provisions 
to ensure that such motions are decided quickly. 
2. Amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 to reach a broader range 
of non-party interested entities or persons.”47 This is to help judges know 
and understand when they have a financial interest in one of the parties 
to a lawsuit. 
3. Establish procedures encouraging courts to stay a PAE’s infringement 
action against a customer or end-user, where the PAE has also sued the 
manufacturer of the accused product under the same theory of 
infringement.”48 The FTC reasoned that a manufacturer has much better 
information than retailers or end users do, and hence it would make 
sense, from a judicial economy perspective, to stay all suits other than 
the one(s) against the manufacturer(s). 
4. As courts continue to address the ‘plausibility’ of pleadings in patent 
cases, ensure that patent infringement complaints provide sufficient 
notice to accused infringers.”49 Because an amendment to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure from 2015 essentially required greater 
specificity in patent infringement litigation, the FTC is, in essence, 
exhorting the Federal Courts to pay attention to the new rule.50 
This critique of the Report demonstrates that the Report may be 
fundamentally misleading and induce counterproductive policy 
responses in at least two different ways.51 First, the FTC’s analysis 
                                                
 46 Id. at 9. 
 47 Id. at 11. 
 48 Id. at 12. 
 49 Id. 
 50 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012). 
 51 We will not address the numerous methodological issues with the FTC’s PAE 
Activity Report. Those issues have been ably covered by others. See Kristen J. 
Osenga, Sticks and Stones: How the FTC’s Name-Calling Misses the Complexity 
of Licensing-Based Business Models, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001 (2015); Anne 
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of the litigation data is potentially defective. Second, the policy 
recommendations neither flow directly from the data (even if the 
analysis were to have been done better), nor are they necessarily as 
innocuous as they seem at first glance. 
Before we jump headlong into an analysis of the litigation data 
and its import, we must consider why we are doing so. Although 
there are no new patent reform bills that have any chance of passing 
at this time, it is crucial to understand the FTC’s Report’s failure 
now; when the federal government calms down and gets back to 
business, because of either elections or another reason, bills that can 
pass will be introduced, and the Report will undoubtedly be cited to 
support some of these bills. In addition, a court may utilize the 
Report to help decide a case or to reform doctrine. For these reasons, 
we must analyze and understand the Report. 
II.  LITIGATION DATA 
To understand the FTC’s litigation data, we must first focus on 
the difference between nuisance suits and meritless suits.52 Meritless 
suits are those that, if taken to trial, would almost certainly lose. The 
judge or jury would rule against the plaintiff and the suit would fail. 
On the other hand, a nuisance suit, as used by a few analysts and the 
Report, is one which is not worth bringing once one includes 
plaintiff’s litigation costs.53 In some of the academic literature, 
                                                
Layne-Farrar, What Can the FTC’s Section 6(B) PAE Study Teach Us? A 
Practical Review of the Study’s Methodology, Results, and Policy 
Recommendations, 13 J. COMPETITION. L. & ECON. 1 (2017). 
 52 The discussion in this section follows the excellent explanation in Kathryn E. 
Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS § 4 (A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
 53 This distinction, but with “frivolous” replacing “meritless,” is exactly the 
same as used by William Hubbard in his recent paper. See Sinking Costs to Force 
or Deter Settlement, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 545 (2016). “[A] ‘nuisance suit’ is 
a suit filed because it has positive settlement value, notwithstanding the fact 
that it is common knowledge to the plaintiff and the defendant that the expected 
value plaintiff’s claim is less than the plaintiff’s cost of prosecuting the suit.” Id. 
at 545 (emphasis in original). “‘Frivolous litigation’ in common usage and 
in the sense that . . . [we] will use the term herein, is a species of nuisance 
litigation. In a frivolous suit, the expected value of plaintiff’s claim is less than 
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“nuisance” suits are called, more accurately, “negative expected 
value” suits.54 That is because nuisance is pejorative, and can easily 
be mistaken for “meritless.” However, the Report routinely uses the 
word “nuisance.” For example, the Report states, “Given the 
relatively low dollar amounts of the licenses, the behavior of 
Litigation PAEs is consistent with nuisance litigation.”55 
The Report, in my opinion, has several fundamental problems 
when it describes the litigation data. 
First, the Report consistently utilizes the phrase “nuisance suit,” 
rather than the more neutral Negative Expected Value (“NEV”) suit. 
This pejorative can mislead the reader into thinking that NEV suits 
are meritless. But this is not true. The category of NEV suits 
includes both meritless suits and meritorious suits. Whereas the 
former may be worthy of disapprobation, the latter have value, 
particularly in contexts like patent, where enforcing rights is 
supposed to guide conduct and produces spillover benefits. 
Second, the Report incorrectly claims that a low settlement 
amount implies that the suit was a NEV suit. This is wrong. A low 
                                                
plaintiff’s cost of litigating because the claim is extremely low merit—the 
likelihood of prevailing at summary judgment (let alone trial) is so low that 
the expected value of the claim is near zero.” Id. Similarly, Lucian Bebchuk 
and Alon Klement state:  
It should be emphasized that an NEV [Negative Expected 
Value] suit need not be a frivolous suit—that is, a suit in 
which the plaintiff is unlikely to win. The expected judgment 
is a product of the likelihood of a plaintiff’s victory and the 
amount at stake. Therefore, a meritorious suit—one in which 
the likelihood of a plaintiff victory is quite high—might be 
NEV if the litigation costs involved are sufficiently large 
relative to the amount at stake. 
Lucian Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative Expected-Value Suits 53 (Harv. 
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 656, 2009).  
 54 See Layne-Farrar, supra note 24; see also Robert G. Bone, Modeling 
Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997) (discussing at length the definition 
of “meritless suits”). Defendants undoubtedly regard all suits as a “nuisance.” No 
one likes to be sued. But if the plaintiff is likely to win at trial, using the term 
“nuisance” is likely to misleadingly convey the impression that the suit is 
meritless or, equivalently, “frivolous.” 
 55 FTC, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasis added). 
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settlement amount is completely consistent with both Positive 
Expected Value (“PEV”) suits and NEV suits. 
Third, putting the first two points together, there is absolutely no 
link between low settlement amounts and “bad” lawsuits. 
A. Nuisance Suits v. Meritless Suits 
The FTC repeatedly calls NEV suits “nuisance” suits, and does 
so in a way that demeans them. For example, consider the statement 
at page ten of the Report: 
The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), which 
periodically surveys the costs of patent litigation, recently reported that 
defending an NPE patent lawsuit through the end of discovery costs 
between $300,000 and $2.5 million, depending on the amount in 
controversy.
 
By this estimate, 77% of Litigation PAEs’ settlements fell 
below a de facto benchmark for the nuisance cost of litigation. This 
suggests that discovery costs, and not the technological value of the 
patent, may set the benchmark for settlement value in Litigation PAE 
cases.56 
What does the FTC mean by stating that it may not be “the 
technological value of the patent” that is helping to set the settlement 
value for cases that settle for less than the lower end of discovery 
costs, $300,000? On its face, the FTC’s statement is almost always 
right. The technological value of the patent is reasonably interpreted 
to mean how useful the patented technology is in implementing an 
invention. But there is no reason that the technological value, by 
itself, ought to play a role in settlement value. Instead, it is the 
economic value of the patent that should play a role in determining 
settlement amount, which is likely what the FTC meant. Therefore, 
we will interpret the FTC to be claiming that if the settlement 
amount is less than $300,000, then the underlying economic value 
of the patent may have played no role in settlement amount. And, it 
is reasonable to infer that the FTC is claiming that such patents often 
have an economic value far less than $300,000.57 
                                                
 56 Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 57 The patents that are settled for less than $300,000 might have low value (if, 
in fact, they do) either because they have little chance of being upheld in a court 
challenge, or because the patent claim is likely valid, but for very low damages. 
Either way, the assertion is that the patent is of very little value. For purposes of 
discussion below, we will discuss both possibilities. 
OCT. 2018] Patent Trolls 91 
The FTC reinforces the point about “nuisance” suits by 
producing the following chart at page 89 of the Report, entitled 
“Frequency Distribution of Patent Licensing Royalties.” The FTC’s 
ensuing discussion repeatedly refers to nuisance value. Thus, on 
page 91, the Report states:  
the revenues received in patent licenses, particularly those 
for relatively small amounts, may have been influenced 
heavily by the parties’ desire to avoid the cost of litigation. 
To evaluate the possibility that PAE licenses may reflect 
nuisance-value settlements, the FTC compared license 
royalties to the estimated cost of patent litigation.58 
 
 
 
                                                
 58 FTC, supra note 2, at 89 (footnote omitted). 
Figure 1: FTC’s figure showing distribution of settlement amounts 
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And, after a discussion of the distribution of settlements in the 
chart above, the FTC concludes “By these estimates, 77% of 
Litigation PAE settlements were valued below an approximate 
benchmark representing the nuisance value of litigation, while 78% 
of Portfolio PAE licenses were equal to or greater than the nuisance 
value of litigation benchmark.”59 
The FTC’s demeaning NEV suits by calling them “nuisance” 
suits is wrong. Those NEV suits that are meritorious should not be 
disparaged by the FTC. Meritorious suits may have social value by 
guiding the conduct of third parties. Thus, patent law has a role to 
play similar to the role of traditional common law—tort suits may 
deter costly torts;60 contract law can encourage valuable 
exchanges;61 and real property law can encourage people to build 
houses and improve land.62 Patent law can help encourage people to 
invest in future inventions, and to commercialize inventions once 
they are made.63 Meritorious patent suits, including those that cost 
so much that pursuing them is noneconomic for the plaintiff (and, 
hence, “nuisance” suits in the FTC’s lexicon), can play a valuable 
role in setting incentives for third parties. For this reason, those suits 
should not be disparaged by calling them nuisance suits. Of course, 
the term “nuisance suits” also includes meritless suits, and these 
suits should, in general, be discouraged. But figuring out how to deal 
with a category that includes valuable suits and valueless suits 
requires far more nuanced analysis than that appearing in the FTC’s 
                                                
 59 Id. at 92. 
 60 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (Yale Univ. Press 1970). 
 61 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2011); Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541(2003). 
 62 The analogy to property law can be very instructive. The FTC’s reasoning 
would imply that suing to eject trespassers from cheap tract homes is less 
defensible than suing to eject the same trespassers from a very expensive home. 
The suit to recover possession of the tract home is, after all, much more likely to 
be NEV. This reasoning cannot be right. 
 63 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV., PAPERS & PROC. 347, 355 (1967). See generally F. Scott Kieff, 
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 697 (2001); Spulber, supra note 6; Yelderman, supra note 6. 
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Report, and will likely produce policy recommendations that differ 
greatly from those in the Report. 
B. Low Settlement Amount and the Quality of the Lawsuit 
The FTC makes a second error when describing the litigation 
data; the Report incorrectly asserts that a low settlement amount 
implies that the underlying lawsuit was NEV—a “nuisance suit” in 
the FTC’s terminology. This assertion is wrong, and almost 
certainly represents a major problem with the FTC’s argument 
structure. There is, in reality, no analytical connection between a 
lawsuit settling for a small amount of money and the underlying 
nature of the claim. More precisely, the settlement amount tells us 
virtually nothing about whether or not the underlying suit was PEV, 
NEV, or even whether or not it was likely meritorious. Of course, 
the data represented in the chart above may be intrinsically 
interesting. But the FTC is (like the rest of us) interested in policy 
implications. Since the FTC has premised its policy 
recommendations on the incorrect claim that most litigation PAEs’ 
lawsuits are “nuisance suits,” the policy recommendations are not 
supported by the Report’s facts and analysis. 
To establish my central analytical point—the lack of connection 
between settlement amount and the nature of the underlying 
lawsuits—we will proceed through a series of different types of 
models of lawsuits. Some of them are explained through examples. 
None of the models demonstrate any connection between settlement 
amount and the nature of the underlying lawsuit. NEV lawsuits can 
settle for large amounts of money, and PEV lawsuits can settle for 
small amounts of money. 
1. Example 1—Symmetric Information and Positive Expected 
Value 
In this example we assume that one patent owner (plaintiff) sues 
one manufacturer (defendant). The plaintiff and defendant agree that 
if the case were to be taken all the way through trial the plaintiff 
would certainly prevail, and would be awarded $500,000. They also 
both agree that to push the case all the way to verdict will cost the 
plaintiff $480,000 and will cost defendant $400,000. With all these 
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facts in mind, and before litigation takes place, the parties will 
approach the issue of settlement. 
Defendant makes final offer: Assume that the litigants agree that 
defendant will make the final offer. Note that this does not have to 
be the first offer, only the last one. It turns out that all the power lies 
with the person who makes the last offer.64 Why would the defendant 
make the last offer? Likely because defendant has established a 
reputation for making an offer and never deviating from it. But it 
could also be that the defendant has found another commitment 
device not to waiver after his offer. How much will the defendant 
offer? Will the plaintiff accept? The defendant will first calculate 
the plaintiff’s net gain from going through trial. That is $500,000 - 
$480,000 = $20,000.65 Thus, to induce the plaintiff to accept the 
defendant must offer a bit more. In the limit, the offer is $20,001. 
The plaintiff will accept because $20,001 is more than $20,000. We 
will observe a settlement for only $20,001, even though the 
underlying lawsuit is completely meritorious and has PEV (in other 
words, not a nuisance.) 
Plaintiff makes final offer: Assume, in contrast to Example 1.a., 
that the plaintiff will make the final offer. This may be 
counterintuitive. However, some lawyers work very hard at 
establishing a “thug” type of reputation. Consider Erich 
Spangenberg: 
If you’re a corporate executive, this may be one of the last sentences you 
want to hear: “Erich Spangenberg is on the line.” Invariably, Mr. 
Spangenberg, the 53-year-old owner of IPNav, is calling to discuss a 
patent held by one of his clients, which he says your company is 
infringing — and what are you going to do about it? 
                                                
 64 Having the right to make the final offer of settlement is a reflection of 
bargaining power. In this example the defendant has all of the bargaining power. 
Even in a multiperiod model with alternating offers, making the final offer gives 
that party all of the surplus from settlement. Spier, supra note 52, at 11-12. 
 65 We are assuming no chance of the court awarding plaintiff attorney’s fees. 
The recent case of Highmark v. Allcare Health Management System appears to 
have made it marginally easier for victorious plaintiffs to be awarded attorney’s 
fees. See Highmark v. Allcare Health Management System, 134 S.Ct. 1744, 1749 
(2014). 
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Mr. Spangenberg is likely to open the conversation on a diplomatic note, 
but if you put up enough resistance, or try to shrug him off, he can also, 
as he put it, ‘go thug.’ 
He demonstrated what that sounds like in a brief bit of role-play recently, 
sitting in the apartment he is renting for the summer in Paris near the Arc 
de Triomphe. His voice dropped, the curse words flowed, and he spoke 
with carefully modulated menace.66 
IPNav, Spangenberg’s company, routinely sues when his offer 
to settle is refused. Between 2008 and 2013, IPNav sued 1,638 
companies.67 This is the sort of situation that case 1.b. models. 
What is the highest offer the plaintiff can make that will be 
accepted? If the case goes to trial the defendant will lose the 
$500,000 damages, plus the $400,000 in costs. This sums to 
$900,000. The plaintiff has to offer something a bit less than 
$900,000 to induce the defendant to accept the offer. In the limit, the 
offer is $899,999. The defendant will accept because $899,999 is 
less than $900,000. Thus, we will observe a much higher settlement 
amount, even though nothing has changed about the underlying 
lawsuit. 
Either plaintiff or defendant might make final offer: Assume that 
neither party is certain which of them has the resolve to commit to 
giving the final offer. The parties agree, however, that the defendant 
will make the final offer with probability p, and the plaintiff will 
make the final offer with probability with (1-p), where 0≤p≤1.68 In 
this case, the parties will settle for about p($20,001) + (1-
p)($899,999). When p=1, we get Example 1.a.; when p=0, we get 
the settlement in Example 1.b.; and when p is in between, we get a 
settlement between those values. For any value of p>.68, the 
                                                
 66 David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N. Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2013, at BU1; see also Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino, A 
Reputation for Being a Nuisance: Frivolous Lawsuits and Fee Shifting in a 
Repeated Play Game, 18 INT’l REV. L. & ECON. 147 (1998) (providing additional 
economic theory). 
 67 Segal, supra note 66. 
 68 Thus, p represents the defendant’s bargaining power, and 1-p represents the 
plaintiff’s bargaining power. For an excellent discussion of bargaining power in 
the context of determining a reasonable royalty, see J. Gregory Sidak, Bargaining 
Power and Patent Damages, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
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settlement will be less than $300,000, the FTC’s value for 
concluding that a suit has NPV,69 and is therefore a “nuisance.” 
Implications: What are the lessons to be learned? First, the FTC 
is wrong. Observing a suit settle for less than $300,000, possibly 
much less than $300,000, does not let us deduce that the suit is NPV. 
Of course, we cannot deduce that the suit is meritless. In the example 
above the suit had both merits and PEV. Second, it is bargaining 
power, represented in the examples by the likelihood of giving the 
final offer, which greatly determines the size of the settlement. 
That is the theory. Is it borne out in practice? After all, as the old 
saying goes, the difference between theory and practice is much 
larger in practice than in theory. The answer is that it is very hard to 
confirm or disconfirm this bargaining theory in naturally-occurring 
environments. We have no way to observe, directly and in the field, 
the parties’ beliefs about the likelihood of the plaintiff’s prevailing 
and the expected size of damages. To test the theory, social scientists 
have resorted to bargaining games in laboratory experiments. 
The experiments that are the most germane are probably those 
called “ultimatum” experiments. In an ultimatum game there are two 
subjects. Their task is to divide some money, say $10. One of them 
is chosen to make a first-and-final offer, while the other subject has 
the right to accept or reject the offer. Thus, the first subject might 
offer $3 to the second subject (and implicitly keep $7 for himself). 
The second subject can either accept with one outcome ($7, $3), or 
reject with another outcome (0, 0). If the ultimatum game is truly a 
single-shot interaction, game theory predicts that the first subject 
will offer only $1 (assuming one dollar minimum increments), and 
the second subject will accept because $1 is more than $0. This game 
gives all the bargaining power to the first subject. 
However, when experimental economists first started running 
these experiments they found that offers were much greater than the 
theory suggested.70 The experiments show that those who have 
                                                
 69 FTC, supra note 2, at 92. 
 70 See Robert Forsythe, J. L. Horowitz, NE Savin & M. Sefton, Fairness in 
Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 347, 349-51 (1994) 
(experiments run and sources); see also Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L Spitzer, 
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bargaining power get more of the surplus from making a deal, 
depending on the circumstances. Thus, while dividing $10, the 
offerors in ultimatum experiments frequently offered $5 or $4. 
Many researchers originally thought that these offers represented a 
taste for fairness, and even developed utility functions that 
attempted to model the subject’s tastes. However, in an extremely 
careful series of articles, Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Keith 
Shachat, and Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith (“Hoffman, et al.”) 
demonstrated the majority71 of the deviation from the game theoretic 
ideal stemmed from other sources.72 First, the students worried that 
                                                
The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982). Early 
bargaining experiments showed that in face-to-face negotiations, where the 
parties and their choices were observed by the experimenters, experimental 
subjects were much more altruistic than theory predicts. It appears that subjects 
are worried about getting a reputation for being selfish. Thus, the subjects are 
playing a very different game than the one represented in the bargaining game 
they are nominally playing. If, on the other hand, the experimenters take care to 
ensure that the subject’s choices can be observed by neither the experimenter nor 
the other subjects, the subjects pay much closer attention to the experimental 
bargaining game they are playing, and often make choices so as to maximize their 
own payoffs. 
 71 Fairness concerns, in some guise or other, do seem to play a role, as well. See 
Güth & Kocher, infra note 72. 
 72 See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Preferences and Property Rights in 
Ultimatum Games and Dictator Games, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS RESULTS 417-22 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., North 
Holland 2008); Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Reciprocity in Ultimatum and Dictator 
Games: An Introduction, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
RESULTS 417-22 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008); Elizabeth 
Hoffman et al., Prompting Strategic Reasoning Increases Other-Regarding 
Behavior, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 423-28; 
Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Reciprocity in Dictator Games, in 
supra, at 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 429-35; (Charles 
R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008); Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Preferences, 
Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES & ECON. 
BEHAV. 346 (1994); Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-
Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653 (1996). For an 
excellent review of ultimatum games, stressing the complex interaction between 
fairness concerns and individually rational behavior, see Werner Güth & Martin 
G. Kocher, More Than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: 
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they might be facing an opponent who would “punish” unfairness 
by rejecting the offer. If you think your counterpart might “punish” 
unfairness, the optimal strategy is to offer an amount considered 
“fair,” and to maximize your expected value, which is the offer 
amount times the chance you will not be rejected. Second, students 
might also worry about their reputations among their fellow students 
and with the researcher. The student subjects did not want to look 
greedy. After all, their fellow students would likely be sources of 
jobs, club memberships, and maybe a spouse or two in the years 
ahead. The researchers, on the other hand, could provide access to 
more experiments, and also possibly letters of reference. All of this 
might be put at risk if a subject appeared too greedy. Third, the 
subjects needed to be induced to believe that the right to make the 
ultimatum offer was truly their right. Previous experiments used 
language that put the issue very much in doubt, suggesting that the 
right might be more communally owned. 
To deal with the rights issue, Hoffman, et al., distributed the 
right to make the ultimatum offer either by making the subjects 
compete in a contest, with the winner getting the right to make the 
offer, or by auctioning off the right to make the offer. These 
treatments induced more selfish behavior. To deal with the 
reputation issue, Hoffman, et al., invented some very clever 
procedures that ensured students that their choices were anonymous, 
both from the other students and from the researcher. 73 Together, 
these procedures induced much more self-regarding behavior.74 
In short, the implicit context in which the subjects found 
themselves mattered.75 In spite of experimenters’ initial attempts to 
                                                
Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature, 108 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 396 (2014).  
 73 This was only used in the dictator game. 
 74 By “self-regarding” we mean only that the offerors chose offers that were 
much closer to the prediction for a single-shot game—$1. It is not synonymous 
with “selfish,” although it could be that behaviorally the two concepts would look 
much the same. Because the resulting offers were closer to $1, but not equal to 
$1, it is quite possible that the offeror was responding, in part, to his perception 
of the responder’s utility, as well as his own. 
 75 Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, Social Distance and 
Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653, 654 
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put the subjects into a single-shot game, the students saw themselves 
as embedded in a different, longer run game where reputation 
mattered. And subjects needed to feel entitled to the right to make 
the ultimatum offer. After Hoffman, McCabe and Smith addressed 
these issues, subjects became much more self-regarding, and 
fairness concerns faded (but not quite entirely) into the background. 
There is also strong evidence that a very large increase in stakes 
induces more self-regarding behavior.76 When Andersen, et al., 
increased the stakes to equal the pay for about 1600 hours of work, 
the offers (as a percentage of the total amount at stake) went down, 
and the acceptance rate went up.77 Smaller increases in stakes, 
however, do not produce the corresponding increase in self-
regarding behavior.78 
There is every reason to believe that litigants in patent suits will 
behave even more selfishly than did the subjects in Hoffman, et 
al.’s, experiments. First, the plaintiffs obtained the patents by 
purchasing them or by inventing something and getting the patent 
from the Patent Office. Purchasing the patent corresponds to 
purchasing the right to make the ultimatum offer, and getting a 
                                                
(1996). (“We explore in detail the large observed discrepancy between these two 
very disparate versions [fairness and reciprocity] of the dictator game. Our 
working hypothesis is that the difference is due to the concept of social distance 
or sense of coupling between the dictator and his or her counterpart, or others who 
know the dictator’s decision. We systematically vary this distance by changing 
elements of the language and procedures that a priori bear on the degree of the 
dictator’s anonymity, and social isolation, in each of these two polar treatments. 
The significance of social isolation is in the removal of all suggestion of the quid 
pro quo of reciprocity. We believe that this experimental exercise is fundamental 
to understanding the received evidence for other-regarding behavior that is 
frequently manifest in bargaining game experiments, but in which strategic 
reciprocity and utilitarian elements are confounded in interpreting observed 
outcomes.”). 
 76 Steffen Andersen et al., Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games, 101 AM. ECON. 
REV. 3427, 3428 (2011). 
 77 Andersen, et. al., supra note 76; see also Christopher Bechler, Leonard Green 
& Joel Myerson, Proportion Offered in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games 
Decreases with Amount and Social Distance, 115 BEHAV. PROCESSES 149, 153 
(2015). 
 78 Andersen, et. al., supra note 76, at 3432, fig.2. 
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patent from the Patent Office corresponds to the contest in Hoffman, 
et. al.’s, work. The plaintiffs in patent lawsuits should feel entitled 
to their rights. The reputation concerns that made student subjects 
concerned about appearing too greedy should work the opposite way 
with litigants. A reputation for being tough and unwilling to share 
should produce higher settlement amounts in the future. 
In summary, there is no reason to refrain from using the theory 
to analyze patent suits and settlements. In fact, the Report cited some 
of the economics literature that created the theory for litigation. 
2. Example 2—symmetric information and negative expected value 
Is it possible that a plaintiff can extract a positive settlement 
amount even if both plaintiff and defendant know that the plaintiff 
will lose money if he pushes the case all the way through verdict? 
The answer is maybe. First, we will go through an example designed 
to show negative expected value suits might succeed, and then we 
will consider the response by Schwartz and Wickelgren.79 Even if 
the NEV suit is successful, the settlement amount might be large, or 
it might be small depending on how much bargaining power the 
defendant has. Once again, the size of the settlement does not reveal 
whether the underlying suit is PEV or NEV. 
To see how this works, consider a slight modification of the 
examples above.80 In the modified version the plaintiff has a cause 
of action that will produce a verdict of $500,000 with certainty. But 
in this version, there are three stages of litigation, each with 
attendant costs for that stage. We will call the three stages S1, S2, 
and S3. You may think of them respectively as pleading, discovery, 
and trial if you like. Each of the three stages has costs associated 
                                                
 79 Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Advantage Defendant: Why 
Sinking Litigation Costs Makes Negative-Expected-Value Defenses but Not 
Negative-Expected-Value Suits Credible, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (2009). 
 80 The following examples are based on Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory 
Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1996) (introducing the idea of stages of litigation into the formal literature). The 
stages of litigation allows a NEV plaintiff to (sometimes) gain a positive 
settlement. Bebchuk introduced the idea with a two-stage example, followed by a 
formal model. See also Spier, supra note 52, at 271-72.  
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with it, Cp for the plaintiff and Cd for the defendant. For this version 
assume that the costs are as listed in the following table: 
 
Table 1. Cost of Suit 
 S1 
(pleading) 
S2 
(discovery) 
S3  
   (trial) 
 
Cp 
(plaintiff’s 
cost) 
 
$75,000 
 
$75,000 
 
$400,000 
Cd 
(defendant’s 
cost) 
$100,000 $100,000 $400,000 
 
 
Bargaining before S3: If the suit gets to the point right before S3, 
we know how to figure out what the settlement will be. Note that at 
this stage the suit has become PEV. The plaintiff rationally ignores 
the expenditures from the pleading and discovery stages. Thus, the 
plaintiff will definitely push forward with the trial if no settlement 
is reached. At the end of the trial the plaintiff will be $100,000 better 
off ($500,000 verdict less $400,000 in trial expenses.) The 
defendant, on the other hand, will be $900,000 worse off ($500,000 
verdict plus $400,000 in trial expenses). If the defendant has the 
right to make the final offer, he will offer $100,000 to settle.81 On 
the other hand, if the plaintiff has the right to make the final 
settlement offer, he will offer $900,000. Now, assume that the 
parties agree that defendant will have the right to make the final 
offer with probability 1/2, and the plaintiff will make the final offer 
with probability 1/2. Then the settlement amount will be 
(1/2)($100,000) + (1/2)($900,000) = $50,000 + $450,000 = 
$500,000. 
                                                
 81 Technically, $100,001. But to make the arithmetic easier we will assume that 
the parties accept offers when they are indifferent. 
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Bargaining before S2: If the suit gets past S1 the parties will be 
faced with the following situation. They both know that if they go 
through discovery (S2), they will be facing trial (S3). They both 
know that if they get that far they will settle for $500,000. This is 
more than the $75,000 that the plaintiff must spend to go through 
discovery. Thus, plaintiff will push ahead and go through discovery 
(S2) if there is no settlement. How much is the settlement amount at 
S2? If the parties were to fail to settle before S2 the plaintiff would 
get $500,000 - $75,000 = $425,000. The defendant would lose 
$500,000 + $100,000 = $600,000. If defendant has the right to make 
the final offer then he will offer $425,000. On the other hand, if 
plaintiff has the right to make the final offer, he will demand 
$600,000. 
Assume that they agree that at this stage (and at S1) defendant 
will have the right to make the final offer with probability 1/2, and 
the plaintiff will make the final offer with probability 1/2. Then the 
settlement amount just prior to S2 will be (1/2)($425,000) + 
(1/2)($600,000) = $212,500 + $300,000 = $512,500. 
Bargaining before S1: The parties know that if they fail to settle 
at S1 that they will settle for $512,500 before S2. By going through 
S1, they will each incur litigation costs. The plaintiff will get, after 
S1: $512,500 - $75,000 = $437,500. The defendant will lose, after 
S1: $512,500 + $100,000 = $612,500. If defendant gets to make the 
final offer prior to S1 he will offer $437,500; while if the plaintiff 
gets to make the final offer he will demand $612,500. Since we 
continue to assume that they agree that there is a 1/2 probability of 
each making the final offer, they will settle for (1/2)($437,500) + 
(1/2)($612,500) = $218,750 + $306,250 = $525,000. 
Thus, it is possible for a NEV suit—a “nuisance suit” in the 
FTC’s terminology—to settle for quite a bit of money. This is the 
contra-negative of the FTC’s claim. A high settlement amount does 
not imply a PEV suit. 
What would have happened if we had varied the bargaining 
power? Let’s assume that the defendant has all of the bargaining 
power. We will show that there will be no settlement, and the 
plaintiff will not pursue the suit. Using the cost and value figures 
from above, before S3 the parties would settle for (1)($100,000) + 
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(0)($900,000) = $100,000. Before S2 the parties would settle for 
$25,000 (which is the $100,000 that the parties would settle for 
before S3, less the $75,000 of plaintiff’s litigation costs in S2). But 
negotiations stall here. Before S1 the plaintiff must spend $75,000 
in litigation costs to get a $25,000 settlement prior to S2. This is 
common knowledge. The defendant will, hence, refuse to offer 
anything and the suit will die at the beginning. The plaintiff will not 
proceed because it would be economically irrational. 
In a response to Bebchuk’s argument, Warren Schwartz and 
Abraham Wickelgren argue that a more realistic bargaining model 
than the one used above will render NEV suits extremely unlikely.82 
In particular, Schwartz and Wickelgren argue that the value of the 
plaintiff’s “outside option”—going to trial— should limit the 
amount the plaintiff can expect just prior to S3. In any reasonable 
description of the bargaining between the plaintiff and defendant, 
Schwartz and Wickelgren claim that the defendant should always 
have the option (in our example) to offer $100,000 (or, possibly, 
$100,001). Once the defendant has done so, plaintiff will not 
rationally proceed to litigation.83 But once the parties know that the 
plaintiff will not get more than $100,000 prior to S3, there will be no 
credible threat to proceed to trial prior to period S1, and the suit will 
never be filed. Thus, argue Schwartz and Wickelgren, NEV suits are 
unlikely to be filed.84 This, of course, impeaches the FTC’s claim. If 
NEV suits are unlikely to be filed in the first place, low settlement 
amounts are very unlikely to imply that the underlying suit was NEV 
when filed. 
Let’s run through a final example (putting the Schwartz and 
Wickelgren critique to one side), otherwise identical to the one with 
equal bargaining power, but where the parties agree that there is a .9 
                                                
 82 Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelegren, Advantage Defendant: Why 
Sinking Litigation Costs Makes Negative-Expected-Value Defenses but Not 
Negative-Expected Value Suits Credible, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (2009).
 82  Schwartz & Wickelgren, supra note 79. 
 83 See id. at 241. 
 84 Schwartz and Wickelgren argue that it is possible, in some circumstances, for 
defendants, using multiple-stage affirmative defenses, to convert PEV suits into 
NEV suits. By doing so, even some PEV suits may be deterred. Even if not 
deterred, the settlement amounts may be lowered. Id. at 243-45. 
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probability that the defendant will give the final offer, and a .1 
probability that the plaintiff will give the final offer. Then, just prior 
to S3, the parties will settle for (.9)($100,000) + (.1)($900,000) = 
$90,000 + $90,000 = $180,000; just prior to S2, the plaintiff would 
demand $180,000 + $100,000 = $280,000, and defendant would 
offer only $180,000 - $75,000 = $105,000. Hence, the parties would 
settle for (.9)($105,000) + (.1)($280,000) = $94,500 + $28,000 = 
$122,500. Working backwards, just prior to S1, the plaintiff’s suit is 
now credible. By spending $75,000 to get past S1 (pleading stage) 
the plaintiff could settle for $122,500. Therefore, prior to S1, the 
plaintiff would demand $122,500 + $100,000 = $222,500, while the 
defendant would offer only $122,500 - $75,000 = $47,500. The 
settlement before S1 is (.9)($47,500) + (.1)($222,500) = $42,750 + 
$22,250 = $65,000. This is well below the $300,000 cutoff used by 
the FTC. 
What does this example show? Sometimes, but not always, 
plaintiffs can get positive settlements in NEV suits. The plaintiff 
needs enough bargaining power to extract enough of defendant’s 
saved costs to get a settlement in a NEV suit. When the plaintiff has 
significant bargaining power the settlement amount can be 
substantial. On the other hand, when plaintiff has just enough 
bargaining power (e.g., .1) to make a NEV suit viable, the settlement 
amount will be small (e.g., $65,000). Thus, small settlement 
amounts are, for NEV suits, neither necessary nor sufficient. To 
remind the reader, this example assumed that the plaintiff was 
certain to win if he went all the way through trial. The underlying 
suit is as meritorious as can be. Further, if the Schwartz and 
Wickelgren argument is correct, NEV suits will not be filed in the 
first place. Neither the size of settlement, nor whether the plaintiff 
chooses to pursue the case, at all, is probative of the merits of the 
underlying suit. 
There are a number of other scenarios in which NEV suits might 
succeed in getting a positive settlement.85 For example, the parties 
                                                
				85 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative-Expected-
Value Suits (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 656, 2009). 
Also, see Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 
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might be asymmetrically informed,86 and the uninformed party 
might extend a settlement offer to a plaintiff with a NEV suit.87 
Alternatively, the defendant might have to spend significant money 
before the plaintiff does, inducing the plaintiff to file suit and the 
defendant to settle, regardless of merits.88 Or, litigation costs might 
be divisible (as in the examples above) and the plaintiff might learn 
something part way through the litigation.89 Or, the plaintiff and his 
attorney may structure their arrangements, possibly by using a 
retainer, so as to credibly convert a negative expected value suit into 
a positive expected value suit.90 But none of these scenarios suggests 
that a small settlement amount allows one to deduce either that the 
suit is NEV or that the underlying suit is meritless. Thus, the FTC’s 
claim fails in many different settings. 
3. Example 3—Asymmetric Information 
Screening model—one sided asymmetric information: When 
only one of the parties is fully informed the game changes, but not 
necessarily in a way that makes the Report become any more 
                                                
(1997), for an excellent earlier review, focusing on meritless negative expected 
value suits.	
 86 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 437, 440–43 (1988); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the 
Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990). 
 87 Section 3.a., which immediately follows this discussion, analyzes the 
situation where the uninformed party extends the settlement offer. 
 88 David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for 
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985); David Rosenberg & 
Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The Option to Have 
the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 26, 42–51 (2006). 
 89 Bone, supra note 54; Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected 
Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006). 
 90 See Zhiqi Chen, Nuisance Suits and Contingent Attorney Fees, 2 REV. L. & 
ECON. 363, 366 (2006) (discussing effect of contingency fees); Hubbard, supra 
note 53; Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Taking a Financial Position in Your 
Opponent in Litigation, AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing shorting 
a defendant’s firm); David C. Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling the 
Stonewall: Retaining Lawyers to Bolster Credibility, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 65, 
69–71 (1996) (discussing a non-refundable retainer). 
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appealing.91 To understand why this is so, we will walk through an 
example where the plaintiff knows everything about his case, but the 
defendant does not know whether the plaintiff has a PEV suit or a 
NEV suit.92 The uninformed defendant makes the offer to settle. 
If the suit is PEV, we will use the following assumptions: The 
plaintiff and defendant agree that if the case were taken all the way 
through trial the plaintiff would certainly prevail, and would be 
awarded $500,000. They also both agree that if the suit is PEV it 
will cost the plaintiff $100,000 to push the case all the way to 
verdict. It will cost defendant $400,000. On the other hand, if the 
suit is NEV, both plaintiff and defendant agree that plaintiff’s costs 
are higher than $500,000, so a rational NEV plaintiff will not push 
the case to trial. The parties also agree that the defendant (the 
uninformed party) will make the final offer. 
What is the lowest offer the defendant can make that will be 
accepted? If the case is PEV and goes to trial the defendant will lose 
the $500,000 damages, plus the $400,000 in costs. This sums to 
$900,000. The plaintiff, on the other hand, will gain, net of costs, 
only $400,000. If the suit is NEV the plaintiff will never take it to 
trial. Further, the defendant can expect every NEV plaintiff will 
accept any positive offer to settle. 
Recall that the defendant is uncertain about which type of suit 
has been brought against him. But he has an idea of the underlying 
distribution of potential suits, either PEV or NEV. Let’s call the 
proportion of PEV suits in the underlying distribution of potential 
suits r. 
If r is very close to one, the defendant will say to himself “I only 
want to settle PEV suits. In order to settle I have to offer $400,000. 
If I offer less than that almost no case will settle. But if I offer 
$400,000 to every plaintiff, I will be paying off some NEV 
plaintiffs. However, since there are so few of them, this is my best 
                                                
 91 See Bone, supra note 54, at 534, for a superb explanation of these models in 
the case of meritless suits. See generally Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial 
Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987). 
 92 This model, in which the uninformed party makes the offer to settle, is often 
termed a screening model. We will review the other sort, where the informed party 
makes the offer to settle, termed a signaling model, after the screening model. 
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strategy.” In this setting, some NEV plaintiffs get settlements, but 
they get the same high settlement amount that the PEV plaintiffs get. 
Thus, we cannot use, in this case, settlement amount to deduce 
whether the suit was NEV or PEV. 
On the other hand, if r is so very close to zero that almost the 
entire universe of potential plaintiffs is NEV, the defendant may say 
to himself “I don’t want to give money to the NEV plaintiffs, and 
they are almost all of the cases. So, I will offer nothing, and take my 
lumps with the few PEV plaintiffs who take me to trial.”93 
When r is in between zero and one, but close to neither, it is 
much more likely that the defendant will employ a mixed strategy, 
offering a settlement with probability s, and no settlement with 
probability 1-s. In response, all PEV plaintiffs will file suit, and 
NEV plaintiffs will file suit with probability f, and not file with 
probability 1-f.94 In this setting, 1-r of the potential plaintiffs are 
NEV, and since they file suit with probability f, the frequency of 
NEV suits among all filings is: 1 − 𝑟 𝑓 (𝑟 + 1 − 𝑟 𝑓) 
Since the defendant offers s of the plaintiff’s settlements, s times 
the fraction above is the portion of NEV suits that settle. But the 
important thing to note for our purposes is that if they settle, the NEV 
suits settle for the same $400,000 amount that the PEV suits settle 
for. Once again, we cannot use settlement amount to deduce the 
nature of the suit, contrary to the Report’s claims. 
Signaling model–one sided asymmetric information: If the 
informed party makes the offer to settle, things may change. In a 
very elegant paper by Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde, 
the authors demonstrate that if the informed party (say, plaintiff) 
                                                
 93 Technically, such a result cannot be an equilibrium. If the defendant offers 
no settlement amounts, then there will be no NEV plaintiffs that will file suit. But 
that means that all plaintiffs are PEV, and the defendant will know this. In 
response, he will want to offer settlements of $400,000 to all plaintiffs. But that 
will induce NEV plaintiffs to file suit. Instead, defendant must use a mixed 
strategy, offering only a (small) portion of plaintiffs a settlement. 
 94 See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of 
Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990) (explaining the result). 
108 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 75 
makes the offer to settle, the high value plaintiffs will separate from 
the low value plaintiffs in their offers.95 The defendants will still 
reject some of the offers in equilibrium. Translating their result into 
the topic of inquiry in this Critique of the Report is almost 
impossible. We can say the Reinganum and Wilde result means that 
suits that would be worth more (if there were perfect information) 
will settle for more money if the informed plaintiffs make the offer 
to settle. But we have not made the connection to NEV suits and 
PEV suits. Within the terms of Reinganum and Wilde’s model, we 
cannot. That is because Reinganum and Wilde expressly assume that 
all plaintiffs have PEV suits.96 
Fortunately, we do not have to guess what will happen if we put 
NEV suits into this model. Farmer and Pecorino extended the 
signaling model to include NEV suits.97 Their inquiry shows that in 
equilibrium the NEV suits are separated from PEV suits, and only 
PEV suits are filed.98 Because the NEV suits are not credible threats 
to go to trial, and because they are separated out, they do not get 
positive offers to settle. Anticipating the lack of an offer to settle, 
the NEV plaintiffs do not file suit. 
Farmer and Pecorino’s result further impeaches the Report’s 
claim that a small settlement amount implies that the underlying suit 
was NEV. Because in the Farmer and Pecorino analysis no NEV 
suits are filed, no NEV suits will be settled. Thus, if one observes a 
settlement, one can be sure the underlying suit is PEV. Thus, within 
the signaling model paradigm, the Report’s claim fails. 
Two-sided asymmetric information: What if both plaintiff and 
defendant knew something about the case that the other did not? For 
example, the defendant might know whether or not the suit is likely 
to end in a finding of liability, while the plaintiff has only a rough 
guess. On the other hand, the plaintiff might know the extent of 
                                                
 95 See Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the 
Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986). 
 96 See id. at 559. 
 97 See Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Negative Expected Value Suits in a 
Signaling Model, 74 S. ECON. J. 434 (2007). 
 98 They also included positive costs of filing a suit, which is needed to make the 
model work. See id. It is a very reasonable assumption. 
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damages (if there is a finding of liability), while the defendant is 
quite uncertain.99 An example of such a situation is in the table 
immediately below. 
 
Table 2. 2-sided limited information 
Only Plaintiff Knows Only Defendant Knows 
Damages = $500,000 Defendant .9 likely to be 
liable 
Damages = $300,000 Defendant .3 likely to be 
liable 
 
Only the plaintiff knows if damages are $500,000 or $300,000, 
while only the defendant knows whether she is .9 likely to be liable 
or .3 likely to be liable. In this setting we cannot figure out what the 
settlement offer will be without making an assumption about who, 
plaintiff or defendant, will be making the offer. 
This is, undoubtedly, more complicated (and possibly more 
realistic) than the other examples we have considered. In general, 
the amount of information that is revealed in the final settlement 
amount depends on which party makes the settlement offer. That is, 
if the plaintiff makes the settlement offer, his private information 
may be revealed in the settlement amount, but the private 
information of the defendant who accepts the settlement will not.100 
Similarly, if the defendant makes the settlement offer, the 
defendant’s private information may be revealed in the settlement 
                                                
 99 See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Settlement Negotiations 
with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information 
Distribution, and Efficiency, 14 INT’l REV. L. & ECON. 283 (1994) (demonstrating 
the structure); see also Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Daniel Klerman, Litigation and 
Settlement under Correlated Two-Sided Incomplete Information (Working Paper, 
2016) (extending the framework); Joel Sobel, An Analysis of Discovery Rules, 52 
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 133 (1989). 
 100 See Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 99, at 283. In their model, as in the 
one-sided information model, there are also pooling equilibria. Daughety and 
Reinganum rule them out by using a refinement on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. See 
id. at 289 n.7. 
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amount, but the plaintiff’s private information will not. Thus, this 
situation lies somewhere between the extremes of asymmetric 
information with only one person uninformed, and either the 
informed or uninformed party to the suit makes the offer. 
The parties’ private information undoubtedly affects the 
settlement value of the suit, with more valuable suits settling for 
more money. But since only part of the private information—the 
part known by the offeror—may work its way into the settlement 
amount, this probably means that the potential dispersion in 
settlement amounts is less in this example than it would be in the 
one sided signaling model if all of the information were known to 
the offering party. 
However, making the connection to the Report’s claim is almost 
impossible. First, Daughety and Reinganum assume that all suits are 
PEV. Thus, within their model, there are no NEV suits to observe, 
settling or going to trial. Second, to my knowledge, no one has 
extended their two-sided model to include NEV suits, similar to 
Farmer and Pecorino’s approach for the pure signaling model. If the 
Farmer and Pecorino approach carries over into this two-sided 
model, then there would be no NEV suits filed here either. But, 
pending more research, the best we can say is that the approach 
might carry over. However, we can say something stronger with 
respect to the Report’s claims: there is nothing in the two-sided 
signaling model that lends support to its claim that a low settlement 
amount implies that the underlying suit is NEV. 
4. Example 4—including default judgments 
The best (and possibly the only) argument (to my knowledge) 
that settlement amount allows one to deduce something about the 
merits of the underlying case (but not about whether the underlying 
case was NEV) comes from William Hubbard.101 Hubbard has a 
model in which settlements include a greater proportion of low-
merits, high-stakes cases than high-merits, low-stakes cases.102 The 
basic insight is that if the defendant can get out of the suit by 
                                                
 101 See William H.J. Hubbard, Sinking Costs to Force or Deter Settlement, 32 
J. L. ECON. & ORGAN. 545 (2016). 
 102 Id. at 355. 
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defaulting in the latter cases—essentially paying the “low-stake” 
amount into court—then the remaining cases will be low-merits.103 
Let’s cast this argument in terms of Example 1, but modify it so that 
the expected recovery, $500,000, is the product of the probability of 
plaintiff’s victory, multiplied by the size of damages if the plaintiff 
is victorious. Let us consider two cases. One in which the probability 
of victory is .2, and the damages (if plaintiff wins) are $2,500,000, 
has expected value of $500,000. A second, in which the probability 
of victory is 1, and damages are $500,000, also has expected value 
of $500,000. A defendant in the second case could just default, pay 
$500,000, and save the litigation costs. But defaulting in the first 
case would cost the defendant $2,500,000, which is likely far more 
than litigation costs plus the expected $500,000 in liability. Thus, in 
the first case, the defendant will need a settlement at some amount 
less than the $2,500,000 prayer. And, says Hubbard’s argument, the 
only settlement we see has a probability of victory at .2 in the 
underlying suit. Repeat this scenario over and over and we will get 
a pool of settlements in cases with low probability of victory, and a 
pool of defaults with high probability of plaintiff victory. 
Hubbard’s argument is smart,104 but it doesn’t seem to apply to 
the patent litigation setting. First, if it were to apply to patent 
litigation, the FTC should have found a large pool of default 
judgments in the data it acquired. However, the FTC found no such 
thing.105 Second, there is a very good reason that a defendant does 
not want to default. Unless the patent has already expired at the time 
of the suit—an unlikely occurrence—the (alleged) infringement will 
                                                
 103 Id.	
 104 Such a result requires that the true amount at stake is not only observable, 
but verifiable by a court virtually at the time of filing the suit. If the stakes are not 
verifiable, the low-stake plaintiffs can pretend to be high-stake plaintiffs early in 
the litigation process, preventing defendants from exercising a cheap default. See 
id. at 561. 
 105 FTC, supra note 2, at 68. The FTC states in its Report’s note 214 that 
“Independent review of the dockets in these lawsuits also identified two instances 
of a Responding PAE obtaining a default judgment.” Id. at 69 n.214. This was out 
of “3,895 cases that were initiated in U.S. district court by 256 unique plaintiffs 
against 1,956 unique defendants between January1, 2009 and September 15, 
2014.” Id. at 68. 
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be ongoing. If the defendant defaults he only pays for past 
infringement, not future infringement. In addition, if the defendant 
were to default and then continue to infringe, he would be sued 
again. But in the subsequent suit the plaintiff would allege bad faith, 
intentional infringement.106 After all, the plaintiff would claim, the 
first suit clearly put the defendant on notice of the infringement 
allegations, and the failure to defend constituted a type of admission. 
Thus, the plaintiff would claim, the second suit should trigger 
enhanced damages, as well as the award of attorney’s fees.107 To 
avoid this outcome the defendant must settle (or litigate to victory) 
the first suit. As part of the settlement the defendant will get a license 
to use the patents at issue. 
5. Example 5—Many Defendants 
Let us assume that a plaintiff owns a patent, infringed (with 
certainty) by all manufacturers in the industry. In addition, we 
assume that damages are equal to $50,000 for each percent of the 
total market the manufacturer has, and that the market (and 
damages) are arranged as in the following table: 
 
Table 3. Many defendants in market 
Manufact
urer 
% 
of 
Mark
et  
P’s 
Litigation 
Cost 
D’s 
Litigation 
Cost 
Damage
s 
     
1 1
0 
$480,00
0 
$400,0
00 
$500,00
0 
2 1
0 
$480,00
0 
$400,0
00 
$500,00
0 
3 1
0 
$480,00
0 
$400,0
00 
$500,00
0 
                                                
 106 See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 107 See, e.g., Highmark v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S.Ct. 1744 (2014). 
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4 1
0 
$480,00
0 
$400,0
00 
$500,00
0 
5 1
0 
$480,00
0 
$400,0
00 
$500,00
0 
6 5
0 
$1,000,
000 
$400,0
00 
$2,500,
000 
 
In addition, assume that manufacturer 6, with better lawyers and 
greater wealth, can impose greater discovery costs on the plaintiff. 
Thus, for all of the manufacturers 1 through 5, litigation costs look 
like they did in Example 1. Plaintiff and all defendants agree that to 
push the case all the way to verdict will cost the plaintiff $480,000 
and each defendant $400,000. But in the case of defendant 6, it will 
cost plaintiff $1,000,000 and defendant $400,000. Further, assume 
that plaintiff, at the start of this example, is cash-constrained. He is 
not able to spend anywhere close to $1,000,000 in litigation costs.108 
Further, as in Example 1, neither party is certain which of them has 
the resolve to commit to giving the final offer. The parties agree, 
however, that the defendant will make the final offer with 
probability p, and the plaintiff will make the final offer with 
probability with (1-p), where 0≤p≤1. In this case, the parties will 
settle for about p($20,000) + (1-p)($900,000). For the purposes of 
this example we will assume that p = .8.109 Thus, the plaintiff will 
sue the first five defendants and settle with each for $196,000. This 
produces a total of almost a million dollars. 
However, for manufacturer 6, things change. Because plaintiff 
has collected approximately $1,000,000 in settlements from the first 
five manufacturers, it can credibly threaten to take the case all the 
way to judgment. If plaintiff takes the case to judgment it will get 
$2,500,000 - $1,000,000 = $1,500,000. Defendant will lose 
$2,900,000. Thus, the plaintiff and defendant will settle for 
                                                
 108 Also assume the secondary litigation finance market cannot provide the 
needed litigation expenses. 
 109 In so doing we are incorporating some of the strength of Schwartz and 
Wickelgren’s critique of settlement bargaining, see Schwartz & Wickelgren, 
supra note 79, as most of the bargaining power goes to defendant. 
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(.8)($1,500,000) + (.2)($2,900,000) = $1,200,000 + $580,000 = 
$1,780,000. The massive change in settlement amount occurs even 
though the underlying lawsuit is identical, except for damages, and 
the size of the defendant’s litigation costs do not change. And it 
happens only because the first five suits, suits which the FTC would 
incorrectly label as “nuisance” (or NEV), settle first. 
Because this sort of market structure is mathematically likely to 
occur (because you can’t have several incumbents in an industry 
with 50% market share, but you can have several with 10% market 
share) it is likely that a scholar, including the FTC, will observe 
many settlements for small amounts of money, and only one for a 
larger amount of money. This does not mean that patent litigation is 
“broken” in any reasonable sense of the word. 
6. Example 6—Self Serving Bias 
There is literature, coming more from psychology and law than 
from economics, focused on why lawsuits fail to settle. This 
literature posits that often plaintiff’s expectations of how much they 
will win at trial are greater than defendant’s expectations of loss at 
trial. If the difference is larger than the expected trial costs, then the 
suit cannot settle; the maximum that the defendant will offer is less 
than the plaintiff’s minimum willingness to accept. This difference 
in beliefs arises because of self-serving heuristics and biases.110 We 
can deduce quickly the effect of self-serving bias on the rate of 
settlement—the rate decreases. However, the effect of this sort of 
self-serving bias on the settlement amount, when settlements occur, 
is ambiguous: although self-serving biases can often be detrimental 
in negotiation, that may not always be the case. Farmer and Pecorino 
show that a self-serving bias apparent to the other side can benefit 
the biased litigant by forcing the other party to make a more 
favorable offer.111 
                                                
 110 See Linda Babcock & Joshua Furgeson, Bounded Rationality in the 
Settlement Process: Empirical Evidence on the Causes of Settlement Failure in 
Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS Ch. 14 
(Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2014). 
 111 See Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Pretrial Bargaining with Self-Serving 
Bias and Asymmetric Information, 48 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 163, 176 (2002). 
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Let’s depict the settlement range from a modified version of 
Example 1, above. (Thus, we are working in the symmetric 
information setting.) In this variation of Example 1, with no self-
serving bias, the plaintiff and defendant agree that if the case were 
taken all the way through trial the plaintiff would certainly prevail, 
and would be awarded $500,000. They also both agree that to push 
the case all the way to verdict will cost the plaintiff $380,000 and 
will cost defendant $300,000. Under these assumptions, if the 
plaintiff will make the final offer (i.e. has all bargaining power) the 
suit will settle for $800,000; if defendant will make the final offer 
(i.e. has all the bargaining power) it will settle for only $120,000.112 
What happens when there are self-serving biases? Assume that 
the Plaintiff thinks that he is certain to win $600,000 if the case goes 
to trial, but the defendant believes that he will lose only $400,000 if 
the case goes to trial. We can see the impact of self-serving bias in 
the parties’ expectations. Under these assumptions, the defendant 
will be willing to pay no more than $700,000 to settle the suit, and 
plaintiff will accept no less than $220,000 to settle the suit. 
 
                                                
 112 We are abstracting away from the Schwartz and Wickelgren, supra note 79, 
critique of settlement bargaining. 
Figure 2 
116 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 75 
 
Thus, we can see that self-serving biases shrink the bargaining 
range. When settlement does occur in the presence of self-serving 
biases, it will be restricted to a smaller range of values. In the limit, 
it will be harder and harder to distinguish situations where the 
plaintiff has the bargaining power from the situations where the 
defendant does. But none of this has obvious implications for NEV 
suits. 
How do self-serving biases play out in the context of asymmetric 
information models? It is not easy to say. One would need to mash 
together self-serving bias with each of the previous models to 
understand the analytics. There are a few general papers that are in 
the field.113 None of them produces the results we would need to 
make the connection between the models and NEV and PEV suits. 
And all of these papers are complex enough that intuition cannot 
make the connection. Until someone works out this complex 
relationship, we must refrain from using any of these papers in this 
critique. Thus, for the moment, we have to conclude that that the 
self-serving bias literature gives us no purchase on the question of 
whether a low settlement amount implies that the underlying suit 
was NEV. This implies, of course, that this literature gives no 
support to the Report’s claim that a low settlement amount implies 
that the underlying suit was NEV. 
C. Summary on Litigation 
The Report claimed that if a suit were to settle for a small amount 
of money then one could conclude that the suit was NEV. By 
                                                
 113 See Andrea Gallice, Self-Serving Biased Reference Points (Collegio Carlo 
Alberto, Working Paper, 2011), www.carloalberto.org/working_papers (showing 
that with both self-serving bias and reference point-based utility functions, fewer 
lawsuits will settle); Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Pretrial Bargaining with Self-
Serving Bias and Asymmetric Information, 48 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 163 
(2002); Farmer & Pecorino, supra note 111; Eric Langlais, Cognitive Dissonance, 
Risk Aversion and the Pretrial Negotiation Impasse (Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive, Working Paper, 2008) (employing a two-stage model in which parties 
are aware of their own biases); Muhamet Yildiz, Bargaining with Optimism, 3.1 
ANN. REV. ECON. 451 (2011) (exploring, among other things, how optimism 
about future bargaining power leads litigants to wait until the last minute to settle). 
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routinely calling NEV suits “nuisance” suits, the FTC indicated that 
the suits were probably meritless, and consequently bad. All of this 
is completely wrong for the following reasons: 
1. The category of NEV suits includes both meritless suits and 
meritorious suits. Whereas the former may be worthy of 
disapprobation, the latter have value, particularly in contexts like 
patent, where enforcing rights is supposed to guide conduct and 
produce spillover benefits. 
2. The Report incorrectly claims that a low settlement amount 
implies that the underlying suit was NEV. This claim is almost 
certainly wrong. In the symmetric information models, low 
settlement amount is completely consistent with both PEV suits and 
NEV suits. Some of the other explanations of settlement that we 
explored allowed us to say something about the underlying suit. The 
signaling models (with either one-sided or two-sided information) 
provided a hint that a low settlement amount revealed the expected 
value of the lawsuit that was being settled. A low settlement amount 
may reveal low expected value. But these models provided 
absolutely no link to the Report’s claims about NEV suits. 
Hubbard’s model, including default judgments, allowed us to 
conclude that settled cases probably had lower probability of 
success on the merits. But it neither seemed to apply to PAE suits, 
nor did it have anything to say about NEV suits. None of the other 
models we explored provided any support for the FTC’s position, 
either. When you put all of this together, we must reject the FTC’s 
claim that a low settlement amount implies that the suit was NEV. 
3. Putting the first two points together, the FTC has failed to 
establish any link between low settlement amounts and “bad” 
lawsuits. 
II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
For the purposes of discussion, we will divide policy 
recommendations into two groups: those that were not in the FTC’s 
Report, and those that were. We will discuss the policy 
recommendations that were in the Report first. 
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The FTC made four policy recommendations, ostensibly related 
(somehow) to the empirical findings.114 So, one might think, the four 
policy recommendations must fail, just as the empirical assertion 
about NEV suits failed. However, the linkage between the FTC’s 
empirical assertions and their policy recommendations was far from 
clear in the Report. Thus, the policy recommendations might have 
appeal, regardless of the failure of the FTC’s empirical assertions. 
But one would need to do more work, unconnected to the highly 
flawed analysis in the Report, to figure out which of the FTC’s 
policy recommendations has appeal. To see why this is true, we will 
pick out the first of the FTC’s recommendations. 
Consider the first policy recommendation–to “[d]evelop rules 
and case management practices to address discovery burden and 
cost asymmetries in PAE litigation.”115 The FTC noted that Rule 26 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to meet and 
work on producing a plan for discovery. The FTC suggested that 
Rule 26 should be amended, inter alia, to require early disclosure of 
asserted claims and infringement and invalidity contentions, as well 
as to limit discovery before preliminary motions together with 
provisions to ensure that such motions are decided quickly. The 
idea, in short, is to reduce defendants’ costs, particularly early in the 
litigation. 
Is this a good idea? Our conclusion from the previous section 
was that one could not tell from the Report’s discussion of NEV and 
PEV suits whether this was a good idea. As an intuitive matter, 
however, the FTC’s suggestion might make sense. After all, 
reducing costs is good. Let’s look at one of the NEV examples 
discussed above to see that this is less clear cut than one might think. 
In particular, let’s rewrite Table 1 above with greatly reduced costs 
for defendant (but not plaintiff). The reduced costs represent the 
effect of the suggested reform. 
 
 
                                                
 114 See FTC, supra note 2, at 8–13. 
 115 See FTC, supra note 2, at 9. “One step toward achieving this goal would be 
to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which addresses discovery in civil 
actions, in a way that helps balance these relative burdens.” Id. at 10. 
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Table 4. Cost of Suit 
 S1 
(pleading) 
S2 
(discovery) 
S3  
    (trial) 
 
Cp 
(plaintiff’s 
cost) 
 
$75,000 
 
$75,000 
 
$400,000 
Cd 
(defendant’s 
cost) 
$25,000 $25,000 $200,000 
 
Recall that in this example the plaintiff is sure to win $500,000 
if the case goes to trial.116 Also, there is a 1/2 chance that defendant 
will make the last settlement offer at each stage, and a ½ chance that 
plaintiff will do so. In the original example, with high costs, the 
plaintiff and defendant would settle for $525,000. This represents a 
slight over-deterrence of the defendant’s infringement, at least when 
compared to the $500,000 expected verdict if the case were to go to 
trial. 
What will happen with lower costs? If we work through the 
arithmetic we find that the parties still settle, but for $350,000. Is 
that better than settling for $525,000? It is certainly better for the 
defendant. But is this better for society? The $350,000 settlement 
amount represents a significant under-deterrence of the defendant, 
rather than the slight over-deterrence of $525,000. It is difficult to 
know whether this is better for society or not. That, in fact, is our 
major point. 
It is very difficult, without doing significantly more work, to 
know if the specific four proposals in the Report are good ideas or 
not. One must, for each reform, carefully trace through its expected 
effects on filing suits, settlement amounts, settlement rates, and 
returns to inventing and patenting. The FTC did not do this work, 
and neither will we in this critique. All we can say is that the case 
for these reforms has yet to be made. 
                                                
 116 Again, we are abstracting from Schwartz and Wickelgren’s critique. See 
Schwartz & Wickelgren, supra note 79. 
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As for policy recommendations that are not in the Report, our 
recommendation is much clearer. Do not rely on the FTC’s analysis 
for creating new policy recommendations. For example, one might 
be tempted, given the analysis in the Report, to ban patent suits that 
are likely to settle for less than $300,000, and involve PAEs. Most 
of these are, according to the FTC, “nuisance” suits, and, hence, 
bad.117 However, as we have shown, many of these suits may be 
meritorious, and have value.118 Hence, getting rid of all such suits 
will likely have great costs. Instead, a reformer should set about to 
find and remove meritless suits. Unfortunately, nothing in the 
Report likely helps a reformer to do so. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Report includes a path breaking collection of data. Because 
of the FTC’s ability to force businesses and individuals to provide 
information, a power that no ordinary researcher possesses, the FTC 
has amassed a data set that can potentially be of great value. For 
example, the Report’s description of litigation PAEs and portfolio 
PAEs structure and behavior is, although not entirely new, very 
instructive. Unfortunately, the FTC made a pair of analytical errors 
that precludes using its work to directly support policy prescriptions. 
Consequently, in terms of providing normative guidance, the Report 
is a failure. 
 
                                                
 117 To be clear, this is not the FTC’s recommendation. But it could be a 
recommendation of someone using the FTC’s Report, without the benefit of this 
article. 
 118 Bebchuk and Klement correctly sum up the ambiguous normative status of 
negative expected value suits: “With respect to NEV suits that are meritorious 
(and are NEV simply because the required litigation costs would be large relative 
to the amount at stake), an NEV plaintiff’s ability to extract a settlement offer 
might well be socially beneficial. In contrast, with respect to NEV suits that are 
frivolous, an NEV plaintiff’s ability to extract a settlement offer might well have 
undesirable consequences.” Lucian Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative 
Expected-Value Suits 8 (Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 656, 2009). 
 
